📏Governance Process

Disclaimer: While this section is directionally correct, the actual numbers may change as we receive product feedback

When a proposal is put forward it will have a mechanism to participate (access) as well as to vote. The outcome of the vote is an indication of sentiment to us about the next network or application that the DropBeast Application should support, guiding the platform's expansion and strategic partnerships.

The significance of this governance model extends beyond mere token utility. It embeds a democratic ethos into the heart of the BEAST ecosystem, fostering a sense of ownership and collective responsibility among its users. By enabling token holders the power of sentiment to more directly shape the platform's trajectory, BEAST not only democratizes the inputs to its decision-making but also cultivates a more engaged and dedicated community.

Plausible scenarios under this governance model could include a proposal to support a rising blockchain network renowned for its innovative smart contract capabilities, appealing to users eager for new farming landscapes. Another scenario might involve a vote on integrating a niche application that offers unique airdrop opportunities, catering to a segment of the community interested in diversifying their airdrop portfolio. In each case, the decision to support these new ventures would be made collectively by the community, reflecting a true synergy between the platform's capabilities and its users' aspirations.

Implications on supply

Here's how each mechanism affects the supply:

Staking Impact on Supply:

• Initially, let S be the total supply of BEAST tokens.

• Let St be the supply of tokens staked in a given year.

• The staking impact for a year is calculated as a percentage of the total supply. If ps​ is the percentage of supply staked per year, then: St=S×ps

• Staking does not reduce the total supply but affects the circulating supply. The circulating supply after staking Cs​ is: Cs=S−St

Locking Impact on Supply:

• Let Sl​ be the supply of tokens locked in a given year.

• If plpl​ is the percentage of supply locked per year, then: Sl=S×pl

• Like staking, locking reduces the circulating supply but not the total supply. The circulating supply after locking Cl​ is: Cl=S−Sl

Burning Impact on Supply:

• Let Sb​ be the supply of tokens burned in a given year.

• If pbpb​ is the percentage of supply burned per year, then: Sb=S×pb

• Burning reduces the total supply. The new total supply after burning Snew​ is: Snew=S−Sb

Demand Fluctuations Based on Voting Phases:

• Pre-Vote Anticipation, demand may increase as users buy tokens to participate in an upcoming vote.

• During Vote, demand stabilizes or slightly decreases as tokens are locked in staking.

• Post-Vote Reaction, demand can either spike (if the outcome is positive and well-received) or drop (if the outcome is negative or controversial).

Pre-Vote Anticipation:

• In the period leading up to a vote, token holders and potential voters may acquire additional tokens to increase their voting power or to meet the minimum requirements for participation (staking or locking).

• The formula for demand increase due to pre-vote anticipation could be: Dpre-vote=Dbase×(1+anticipation)

• Where Dbase​ is the baseline demand, and anticipation​ is the rate of demand increase due to pre-vote activities.

During Vote:

• During the actual voting period, demand may stabilize or decrease slightly as most tokens required for voting are already staked, locked, or burned.

• The formula for demand could revert to the baseline or slightly less: Dvote=Dbase×(1−stability)

• Where stability is a small reduction factor accounting for the temporary cessation of trading activities due to staking or locking of tokens.

Post-Vote Reaction:

• After the voting concludes, demand can fluctuate based on the outcome of the vote. A positive outcome (favorable to token holders) might increase demand, while a negative outcome could decrease it.

• The formula for post-vote demand fluctuation could be: Dpost-vote=Dbase×(1±reaction)

• Where reaction​ is the rate of increase or decrease in demand based on the voting outcome. The positive sign is used for favorable outcomes leading to increased demand, and the negative sign for outcomes that might decrease demand.